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WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK
ABOUT NEUTRALITY:
A COMMENTARY ON THE SUSSKIND–
STULBERG DEBATE, 2011 EDITION
BERNIE MAYER, PH.D.

*

I. INTRODUCTION
We have an incredible appetite for debating the role and meaning of
neutrality in mediation. Mediators seem to be fairly clear about how to
handle neutrality in practice, but confused in theory. That is, mediators
are generally fairly clear about how to present their role, their
commitment to impartiality, their structural independence, and the
practical implications of how they define their role for how they
approach their work. But when we discuss how to conceptualize
neutrality, when we consider how thorough our commitment to
neutrality can be, and when we debate whether such a commitment is
even appropriate, we are often confused, inconsistent, and divided.
Something is going on here beyond the need to clarify our ethical stance
and our commitment to our clients. What does this discussion represent
and what can we learn from this discussion about our identity as conflict
professionals?
Perhaps the most renowned representation of this discussion has
1
been the exchange between Josh Stulberg and Larry Susskind. In their
exchange, Susskind argued that mediators had a responsibility to insure
that the outcome of mediation is fair and stable and that it lead to
2
socially desirable outcomes and precedents. Stulberg responded that
the mediator not only had no such responsibility but also that any
attempt to insure a desirable outcome would undercut the potential
3
mediation offered to disputants and to society. As reported elsewhere

* The Werner Institute, Creighton University.
1. See generally Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to
Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85 (1981); Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation
and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981).
2. Susskind, supra note 1, at 13–18.
3. Stulberg, supra note 1, at 86–87.
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in this issue, Susskind and Stulberg revisited their classic discussion at a
recent court-based-mediation conference held at Marquette University
4
Law School in September 2011. I had the privilege of participating in
5
this panel (moderated by John Lande ). I was impressed by the shelf life
of this discussion, by the continued influence of Susskind and Stulberg’s
framing of the issue, and by their steadfastness in holding to pretty much
the same positions that they articulated thirty years ago. But I do not
think that their framing of the issue gets to the core challenge that the
discussion of neutrality suggests, and I believe that such framing is
misleading in some important ways. On one hand, mediators do not
have the power to insure fair, stable, or socially desirable outcomes, and
6
they generally do not have the power to prevent such outcomes either.
On the other hand, mediators often alter the power dynamics in
7
negotiations. There is no such thing as a level playing field, and as a
result, mediators always have an impact, which is not neutral, on the
8
process and the outcome. Were we not to have such an impact, we
would not be of much value and our help would not be sought. The
challenge is to be conscious, transparent, strategic, and wise in using our
power to promote an ethical and constructive conflict engagement
process.
II. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY NEUTRALITY?
To get at this, let us first consider what we mean by neutrality.
There are many definitions of neutrality—and almost equally as many
critiques of these definitions, especially as applied to the role of
9
mediation. As I see it, neutrality as applied to mediation is composed
of several different and sometimes contradictory elements. These

4. See generally Panel Discussion, Core Values of Dispute Resolution: Is Neutrality
Necessary?, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 805 (2012).
5. John Lande is the Isidor Loeb Professor and Former Director of the LL.M. Program
in Dispute Resolution at the University of Missouri School of Law.
6. See BERNARD S. MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 141 (2004) [hereinafter MAYER 2004] (arguing that mediators offer
unrealistic guarantees to parties in a dispute, such as neutrality and equality).
7. See id. at 142–43.
8. Id. at 141–44.
9. See, e.g., Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality
in Mediation, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 35 (1991); Kevin Gibson et al., Shortcomings of
Neutrality in Mediation: Solutions Based on Rationality, 12 NEGOT. J. 69 (1996); Rachael
Field, Neutrality and Power: Myths and Reality, ADR BULL. (Bond Univ. Dispute Resol. Ctr.,
Robina, Queensland, Austl.), May/June 2000, at 16.
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include structure, behavior, emotion, perception, and intention. The
structural element is about connection and conflict of interest. Are we
connected by history, relationships, culture, gender, ethnicity, or in some
other way to one or more of the parties to a dispute? Will we benefit in
some significant way by a particular kind of outcome? Structural
challenges to neutrality are sometimes obvious. If I am mediating an
employment dispute related to a proposed termination of an employee
and if I may be offered that same job if the termination goes through, no
matter how fair-minded I am, I am not neutral. If I am mediating the
divorce of a niece, I am not neutral. If I own shares in a company that is
a party to a dispute I am asked to mediate, I am not neutral (at least in a
structural sense).
Sometimes, the structural challenges are subtler. If I have been
engaged to mediate disputes in which one of the parties is represented
by a large and influential law firm with whom I have frequently worked,
whereas the other side is represented by a small, struggling firm with
whom I have never worked before and am unlikely to work with again,
then there is a significant structural challenge to my neutrality. I
potentially stand to lose an important source of referrals if I alienate one
side, whereas the consequences of alienating the other side are minimal.
But if we never take on cases where there is any potential challenge to
our structural neutrality, then our scope of practice would be very
limited, particularly if we work in small communities.
Connections abound in our lives. And clients often want us because
they have heard of us or previously worked with us. When are the
structural challenges to our neutrality so great that we need to recuse
ourselves from a particular case, no matter how convinced we are that
we can act in a fair and constructive way? There are plenty of answers
to this question in different codes of professional conduct, but the
bottom line seems to be that we should be transparent about our
connections and exercise judgment about when we cannot ethically act
as a third party. In other words, the boundaries of appropriate behavior
are not clear.
Neutrality as behavior has to do with what we actually do that might
favor one party at the expense of another party. Some behaviors are
clearly gross breaches of neutrality, for example, when we reveal to one
side what the undisclosed bottom line of another side might be or when
we openly take sides on a contentious issue. But when we avoid eye
contact with one party, allow one party to speak at far greater length
than another, or focus on a subject that is important to one party but not
on an issue that is important to another party, we are also behaving in a
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way that is not neutral—that is, we are acting in a way that promotes the
interests of one party over another party.
Of course, there is no way to avoid this situation entirely. Anything
we do—or don’t do—has an impact and often a differential impact on
the parties involved. If we were to be so guarded in our behavior so as
to absolutely minimize the potential of having such an impact, we would
severely limit our ability to be effective. We are expected to prevent
one party from dominating or intimidating another, to see to it that all
relevant issues are addressed, to try to insure that each party has the
opportunity to articulate their concerns, and to have their questions
addressed. While these may seem like neutral actions, they often occur
under circumstances when one party is more powerful or competent at
negotiation than another, and our interventions, therefore, have the
effect of empowering the less powerful party to some degree at the
expense of the more powerful party. We can try to justify such an
intervention by arguing that in the end this benefits everyone, but this is
not always the case. Sometimes the more powerful party would do
better, at least by their own standards, if we were to play a more passive
role. At other times, we may actually advance the cause of the more
powerful party by trying to adhere to a more neutral role. In a sense,
our very attempt to be neutral is sometimes the source of non-neutral
behavior. In other words, complete behavioral neutrality is not an
option. All playing fields advantage some parties more than others, and
all interventions or actions do the same.
Emotional neutrality, which is sometimes referred to as impartiality
10
or lack of bias, is even more difficult to monitor. Part of what allows us
to be effective involves our connecting with parties emotionally and
being empathetic. We naturally have feelings about the situations and
the parties—sometimes stronger, sometimes less so—and sometimes we
have positive feelings toward one party and negative feelings toward
another. We also find ourselves mediating issues about which we have
strong opinions. For example, divorce mediators have all experienced
cases where agreements were reached about the care of children that
are not what we consider to be the best for the children or the families.
If I had to step aside from acting as a mediator every time I found
myself more sympathetic toward one side than another or in
disagreement in some way with the outcome emerging from the process,
10. See MAYER 2004, supra note 6, at 17, 29–30; CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE & PETER J.
WOODROW, HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL AND MULTICULTURAL NEGOTIATION 419 (2010).
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I would find myself without much work. It may be that I like one party
more than another, that I am more concerned about that party’s
circumstances, that I can empathize with that party’s point of view, or
that I agree with that party’s arguments. This does not mean that I
express these thoughts openly or directly or that I act on them. But,
nonetheless, they are there, and it is likely that I will be better able to
monitor their impact on how I handle myself as a mediator if I am
honest with myself about this situation than if I deny this reality.
Ironically, and I have heard this from many other mediators, the
biggest challenge mediators may face to behaving in a fair way may be
overcompensation for our less-than-impartial feelings. That is, if I am
more sympathetic to one party than to another and if I like that party
more, I may overcompensate and go well out of my way to make sure
the needs of the other party are addressed, thereby doing a disservice to
the party I am sympathetic toward.
We often talk about the perception of bias as opposed to its
actuality. Neutrality is as much about perception as anything else. If we
are perceived to be biased or non-neutral, then to a certain extent we
are. We are often more concerned about acting in a way that will not be
perceived as biased than acting in a way that is actually not biased. It is
the perception that is key. But of course, this is an ephemeral criterion.
If disputants are unhappy about an outcome, then it is easy for them to
assume the process and the mediator have been unfair in some way. If
we are overly concerned with this perception, we can be inhibited from
acting in a responsible manner—for example, by helping people to
articulate what their genuine choices are, fair or unfair though these
may be. However, if we do not pay attention to the potential that we
will be perceived as partial in some way, we may not only undercut our
effectiveness, but we may be ignoring one of the most important ways of
evaluating our own approach.
Neutrality as an aspiration may be the clearest and most meaningful
11
way of understanding this concept. When we commit to impartiality,
neutrality, or evenhandedness, we are essentially expressing an
aspiration rather than a clearly definable commitment. We are saying
that our intentions are to be fair, to be evenhanded, and to act in a
neutral manner without bias—whatever specific meaning we may give to
those terms. We can control the most egregious or obvious expressions
11. See generally BERNARD S. MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT: A GUIDE TO
ENGAGEMENT AND INTERVENTION (2012).
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of bias or partiality, but we cannot offer complete neutrality both
because the term itself is confusing and because it is impossible to
adhere to a strict interpretation of neutrality, no matter which element
we look at. Nonetheless, neutrality as an aspiration is not meaningless,
at least not in practice. Clients expect us to be motivated, to act in a fair
way, and to be attentive to the legitimate concerns of all parties. Our
commitment to trying to do just that is an important foundation of our
connection with our clients. That we cannot actually act in a way that
completely actualizes this commitment does not make the aspiration to
do so unimportant.
III. ARE WE VALUED FOR OUR NEUTRALITY?
Conflict interveners often operate under the assumption that our
12
neutrality is essential to why we are valued and why we are hired. But
in the end, we are not hired to be neutral, impartial, fair, or unbiased,
although people certainly do not want us to be unfair. We are hired to
help people engage in a constructive interaction, usually in the form of a
negotiation. Disputants want our help communicating; understanding
each other; analyzing a conflict; articulating their concerns, ideas, and
arguments in support of their proposals; developing options; evaluating
options; and finding agreements where agreements are possible. If we
do this in a way that is effective and is perceived as competent and
respectful to the disputants, we are fulfilling our most fundamental
commitment. Being neutral is not the core of what people are asking
for—and it is a very culturally relative concept in any event. In some
contexts, being perceived as neutral is a necessary precondition to being
utilized, but in many cultures someone who is neutral and disconnected
13
to a conflict will not be viewed as an appropriate third party.
There is often an inconsistency between what clients genuinely want
and what we offer. Or put a different way, we assert that clients should
rely on our services for reasons that are sometimes at odds with what
clients are looking for. We essentially say that disputants should come
to us because we will offer an impartial, confidential service aimed at
resolving disputes in an amicable and fair way. We will do so by
conducting a private and confidential communication process in which
everyone will be given the opportunity to speak for themselves, decide

12. MAYER 2004, supra note 6, at 29.
13. See MOORE & WOODROW, supra note 10, at 419.
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what is a wise course of action for each of them to follow, and arrive at
integrative solutions that maximize the degree to which everyone’s
needs are met. Disputants, on the other hand, tend to want to be heard
in a meaningful forum, to be acknowledged for the justice of their point
of view and for what they have endured, to have their problems solved,
to be labeled as honorable and reasonable, and to do this all in a socially
14
legitimate and safe setting.
These are not always contradictory
approaches, but they often are. We are in essence asking people to give
up something very important to them, right at the outset of our work
with them, and that is the potential to have their grievance heard in a
powerful and socially sanctioned public forum. Often this sacrifice is
essential to motivating other parties to come to the table. Parties agree
to do this not because they see the great worth of our neutrality or
communication skills but because the alternative paths they might take
are fraught with other kinds of problems (cost, time, uncertainty,
toxicity, and intimidation). In this context, our assertion of our
neutrality and our effectiveness at conducting problem-solving forums,
while not necessarily at odds with what clients want, does not address
what is most important to them.
I am not saying that our commitment to confidentiality and fairness
is not important; instead, I am saying that the focus on neutrality itself
derives more from concerns that we articulate and perpetuate than from
the essential needs or desires of our clients. We are concerned about
neutrality because it helps us identify who we are and distinguish
ourselves from other interveners. This identity and distinction is often
more important to us than to our clients. So why is it so important to
us?
IV. NEUTRALITY AS A SOURCE OF IDENTITY
I believe the debate about neutrality is in essence a discussion of
identity. This is why the debate between Susskind and Stulberg
continues to be gripping. The argument still has traction thirty years
since it originally took place because it addresses our identity as a field
and as professional conflict interveners, not because of its articulation of
essential ethical dilemmas. What Stulberg and Susskind have each
identified, whether intentionally or not, is in essence a statement of who
we are not. We are not a field that can insure or even go very far to

14. See generally MAYER 2004, supra note 6.
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promote—at least directly—a fair, stable, efficient, and wise outcome
15
(four criteria that Susskind proposed during the Marquette panel ) to
disputes. We can set up procedures, convene forums, set the tone, and
facilitate a process that can allow such outcomes to develop as the
circumstances and parties allow, but the effort to promote those kinds of
outcomes cannot be the defining purpose and characteristic of our field.
We simply do not have the power or the substantive expertise to
produce or guarantee such outcomes.
We are also not fundamentally neutral facilitators of a justice event,
16
to use Stulberg’s formulation from the same panel.
As I have
discussed, neutrality is not our primary defining characteristic. We are
not completely or in some respects even significantly neutral, even as to
17
the outcome (which is the type of neutrality that Stulberg emphasizes),
except in the aspirational sense. And yet we do offer important services
that people want and quite often need. The core of what we offer is our
most significant source of identity.
As a field of practice, our professed identity has been partly
borrowed, partly market-based, and often derived from defining criteria
that are not completely convincing. We have borrowed from law,
counseling, negotiation, business, economics, international relations,
labor relations, anthropology, sociology, theology, peace studies, and
education. There is nothing wrong with that. In fact, that is one of our
strengths. Some borrowing is necessary for a field of practice to be
relevant, and many fields borrow just as widely as we do—such as
counseling, social work, and peace studies. But the fact that we have not
always or ever been clear about the essence or roots of our intellectual
foundation accentuates the challenge of the identity discussion. We are
market-based in that we have defined our practice to a large extent from
what the market for our services would support. These defining criteria,
as we have discussed, are often artificial or at least disconnected in some
respects from what we actually do or are asked to do. Our focuses on
confidentiality, impartiality, the third-party neutral role, and reaching
agreements seem to me to be tactics or stances we can take, but not
essential defining characteristics of who we are.
So it is not so hard to say what does not define us. But what does?
Or as we might say, if neutrality, mediation, confidentiality, and
15. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 815.
16. Id. at 810–11.
17. Id. at 811.
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resolution are our positions, what are our interests? I suggest three
18
different elements of identity that the Susskind–Stulberg debate has
raised and that continue to give it traction: our fundamental purpose,
our knowledge base, and the social impact of what we do.
A. Our Fundamental Purpose
Conflict interveners have many different visions of their essential
purpose. For some, our raisons d’être are to resolve conflicts, to forge
agreements, and to bring negotiations to effective conclusions. For
others, it is to promote a transformation of relationships and people,
and for others some it is about building community and contributing to a
more just world. We have many different motivations for what we do
and many approaches to how we accomplish the tasks that we have set
for ourselves. The work of a transformative mediator and the work of
an evaluative mediator are so different that it is hard to understand
19
them as being in the same field sometimes. What has seemed to hold
these disparate approaches together is our understanding of our role as
third-party neutrals who work with people in conflict. So deconstructing
the concept of neutrality—or challenging its ethical basis, as Susskind
20
has done —seems to attack the one unifying principle that has held us
together. But of course we always have been both more and less than a
field of third-party neutrals. For one thing, much of the most valuable
work we have done has not occurred from a neutral stance but from
what I have characterized as ally roles—as advisers, coaches, and
21
advocates, for example. We have also functioned as system designers,
administrators, trainers, evaluators, and in many other roles where we
have not even purported to be third parties, much less neutral. And, as
we have seen, hanging too much of our identity on the commitment to
neutrality is problematic because the concept itself is ambiguous.
The Susskind–Stulberg interchange goes right at the question of
fundamental purpose. Susskind argues our purpose is to get fair, stable,

18. I have intentionally changed the order of who I identify first in referring to the
debate. In the initial debate, Susskind wrote his article and Stulberg wrote the response. See
supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
19. For a rich presentation of different approaches to mediation in the family context,
see DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS (Jay
Folberg et al. eds., 2004).
20. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 815. Susskind argues that mediators should be
fair, efficient, stable and wise, rather than neutral. Id.
21. MAYER 2004, supra note 6, at 222.
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efficient, and wise agreements, and that purpose should govern
22
whatever stance we take toward neutrality. Stulberg argues that our
essential purpose is to provide “a systematic platform and framework
for promoting not only self-determination but also personal
responsibility. It’s the chance to work something out, and not, as we so
23
often want to do, let somebody else do it for us.” The debate here is
not really about the wisdom, nature, or possibility of neutrality, but
about fundamental purpose.
I do not believe either formulation gets at the essential purpose that
genuinely unites and defines the conflict intervention field because both
still characterize that purpose in terms of a third-party role and the
values and ethics implicit in that role. In characterizing what our field is
about, rather than trying to identify ourselves by the particular roles we
play in conflict, we should focus on the purpose of our intervention. As
I see it, the defining purpose of our field, which I refer to as the conflict
24
intervention field, is to help people deal with conflict productively and
constructively—to assist people with constructive engagement in conflict
or, when advisable, constructive avoidance of conflict. We do this from
many different stances, including the third-party stance, but we ought
not to rely solely on a particular set of roles to define who we are. And
if we are not necessarily acting from a third-party role, we are certainly
not always acting as neutrals, even in the aspirational sense. We are
informed by many values—including self-determination, social justice,
and empowerment—but these too are not the essential defining features
of our purpose (although they certainly guide us in how we pursue that
purpose).
B. Our Knowledge Base
Any attempt to define ourselves by what we do—by our
methodologies, procedures, or systems of intervention—will inevitably
run into the incredibly broad variety of approaches that we take. This is
true of psychotherapy, education, organizational development,
architecture, law, and perhaps all disciplines with a strong practice
component. It is certainly true of conflict intervention. But we can,
perhaps, identify some elements of a common knowledge base that
define our field. While there are areas of particular knowledge we need
22. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 819–21, 824.
23. Draft of Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 5–6 (on file with law review).
24. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 815.
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depending on our particular role and area of expertise, as a field we can
identify certain common areas of knowledge that we either have or
should seek to have. These common areas include conflict dynamics,
negotiation, communication, power dynamics, cultural practices, systems
25
theory, intervention processes, and intervention roles.
The meaning of neutrality as a commitment and an intervention tool
has to be understood through the lens of these frameworks in order for
us to really grasp its meaning for our work and our way of thinking. For
example, how does the entry of a third party who aspires to neutrality
affect the dynamics of a conflict and how can this be explained through
systems theory? While we might be tempted to equate neutrality with
the absence of power, this is of course not the case. Taking a neutral
stance can be a very powerful move. By purporting not to have a desire
to affect the outcome, we often position ourselves to have a very
significant impact on what occurs. This is ironic, perhaps, but not
surprising. Sometimes, the less power we try to obtain or to exert, the
more we end up having.
Stulberg and Susskind do not directly address our knowledge base,
but their approaches have significant implications for what that
knowledge base ought to be, none of which are contradictory to what I
have indicated above. However, each of their approaches suggests an
emphasis on a somewhat different element of what we need to know.
Susskind’s approach points to the importance of substantive knowledge
(how else could we evaluate an agreement) and of familiarity with
26
system and power dynamics.
Stulberg’s argument underlines the
importance of our knowledge of communication, negotiation, and
27
process. I suspect that each would argue that all of the above are
important, but I also suspect that in practice they would focus on those
areas that are most conducive to carrying out the fundamental purpose
of conflict intervention as they see it.
C. Our Social Impact
Any field’s identity is wrapped up to some extent with what impact it
has on society and on the larger social good. Even purely abstract fields
of endeavor, such as mathematics or philosophy, ultimately have to

25. See MAYER 2004, supra note 6, at 292–93.
26. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 808–09. It would be impossible to establish a fair,
efficient, stable, and wise outcome without being familiar with these issues.
27. Stulberg, supra note 1, at 98–99.
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contend with this question, and the conflict field certainly does as well.
Our engagement with this question has been intensified by the works of
28
29
30
writers such as Laura Nader, Tina Grillo, and Owen Fiss, who have
directly suggested that the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
movement has had some very significant negative consequences. Both
Susskind and Stulberg are concerned about the impact of what we do,
but come to different conclusions. Susskind argues that, unless we
directly commit to achieving socially desirable ends, both through the
process we set up and through our attention to the agreements reached
in those processes, we can easily become parties to socially undesirable
31
or unjust results. For us to have the very positive social impact, which
32
he clearly believes we have had and can have, we must travel outside
the comfort zone of neutrality and address the wisdom of the outcome.
For Stulberg, the very positive and powerful social impact we have had
requires that we view mediation as a “justice event,” which requires us
33
to be neutral about outcome.
I have written about this same issue as well, and I have argued that
conflict intervention (and indeed all professions) is both an agent of
34
social change and of social control. This is a defining feature of our
existence as intellectual institutions. We cannot escape this tension, but
we can account for it and be conscious of it. We can be alert, for
28. Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1,
3–10 (1993).
29. Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1549–50, 1605, 1610 (1991).
30. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075–76, 1078, 1082, 1085–86
(1984).
31. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 809–10. For example, at the symposium, Susskind
said,
I don’t think you can say: Don’t look to me if the parties don’t show up, [and] don’t
look to me to be responsible for the implications of inequalities between the
parties. . . . If the parties start to talk, and it’s clear from the way they’re talking
that someone [or some group] not present is going to be adversely affected,
wouldn’t you say: Gee they should probably be represented at the table, too.
Draft of Panel Discussion, supra note 23, at 105. He feels we have to intervene to make sure
that unrepresented parties are brought to the table. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 809–10
32. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 814–15. Susskind argues that mediators, by
constructing a good process, contribute to a good outcome, which he defines as one that is
fair, efficient, stable, and wise. Id.
33. Id. at 811.
34. MAYER 2004, supra note 6, at 167.
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example, to the possibility that our intervention, rather than being
empowering, interferes with relatively weak parties getting access to
sources of power that could genuinely help them meet their needs and
that are realistically available to them. If we find ourselves in such a
situation, we may well decide not to continue. Realistically, however,
the calculation is never so straightforward. People have to make choices
about competing routes—about how much to emphasize a cooperative
versus a competitive approach, for example—without knowing for sure
what the implications of each will be over time. And we cannot be sure
either. I have no doubt that there are cases that I have mediated in
which one of the parties would have been better off in the long run had
they chosen a more adversarial approach, although I cannot identify for
sure which cases these are. But I am also convinced that the cumulative
effect of our work, particularly when we build in structural safeguards
(e.g., screening for domestic violence) and when we are open with our
clients about the pros and cons of entering into a particular process, is
fundamentally empowering and supportive of social progress.
Still, we always need to question this conviction as a field both
because others have done so and because it is important for us not to
take the social value of what we do for granted. By debating the impact
of what we do and by considering how our essential assumptions about
who we are affect this impact, we accomplish two essential things. First,
we continue the process of professional-identity formation. Second, we
develop more sophisticated approaches to assessing the impact of our
work. This, I believe, is the essential contribution of the Susskind–
Stulberg interchange. With this dialogue, they have provided us with an
anchor and a framework for such a discussion, and they have also
provided an impetus for us to continue engaging in it.
V. CONCLUSION
On my very first day of orientation to social work school at
Columbia University in 1968, the debate began about whether social
work was a “band-aid” that essentially allowed fundamentally
exploitative systems to continue or whether it was a genuine source of
empowerment that promoted a more just and equal society. This
debate, while at times seeming trite and old, continues to this day and
has been essential to the growth and identity formation of social work.
And of course, social work is both. In a sense, the debate about
neutrality and the responsibility of the conflict intervener for insuring a
just outcome is our analogy to this. And we could almost use the same
language and come to the same conclusion.
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When we talk about neutrality, we are talking about who we are,
what our purpose is, what our impact on the world is, and how we
understand the work that we do. In other words, we are talking about
our identity. I hope, however, that we do not let this discussion of
neutrality become the primary driving force of the identity discussion
that all fields need to have. We are more than third-party conflict
resolvers, and so, the neutrality discussion as a source of identity
formation limits us. I hope we can instead focus on the question of the
purpose that motivates us when we intervene in conflict and the
fundamental assets we bring to such intervention. I think it is time to
lay the Susskind and Stulberg debate to rest, or maybe we can dust it off
every once in a while to see how we currently understand it. I think it
has served its purpose, and its time has gone. We are not hung up about
neutrality. We are grappling with more fundamental issues. That’s
good. I think Stulberg and Susskind would agree.

